The power vacuum left by Mehsud's death has clearly shaken the Taliban
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| companiesandmarkets.com |
2009-11-06 17:51:06 -
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It remains to be seen to what degree the Pakistani Taliban can maintain unity following the death of their leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and whether or not their focus will shift towards Afghanistan as some observers have suggested. To be sure, the new head, Hakimullah Mehsud, will be keen to prove his jihadistcredentials and gain the respect of various militant
groups and this could mean a surge in attacks across Pakistan over the coming months.
The death of the leader of the Pakistani Taliban – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – Baitullah Mehsud in an air raid by a remote-controlled aircraft in South Waziristan on August 5 2009 marked a symbolic victory in the drawn-out fight against militants roaming the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mehsud had masterminded a wave of attacks across Pakistan in recent years, and was a central suspect in the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. The capture of the Taliban´s chief spokesperson, Maulvi Omar, a fortnight later was another key step in neutering the movement. Omar had been key in liaising between different TTP members and a central figure behind the movement´s propaganda machinery.
The power vacuum left by Mehsud´s death has clearly shaken the Taliban, while also raising fears of retaliatory attacks across the country. Indeed, although the perpetrators were unidentified as we went to press, Pakistan´s minister for religious affairs, Hamid Saeed Kazmi, was injured in a gun attack in Islamabad on September 2. Kazmi, a cleric of the moderate Barelvi sect, has been an outspoken critic of the Taliban, making him a prime target for any reprisals.
Following a few weeks of smoke-and-mirrors diversion tactics the Taliban in late August finally admitted Mehsud´s death, with one of his senior aides, Hakimullah Mehsud, in the interim having been chosen to take up his mantle. In the immediate aftermath of Mehsud´s assassination, Hakimullah was rumoured to have been killed in a shoot-out with another top contender for the job, Wali-ur-Rehman. The Afghan Taliban reportedly helped to resolve the discord between the two in a deal that will see Rehman take control of fighters in South Waziristan. However, while some division of labour has been established, internal tensions could persist. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether or not Hakimullah, like his predecessor, will be able to maintain unity among the 13 groups that have joined forces under the TTP umbrella.
Local security experts have stressed the risk that the new commander, who is well-known for his rash temperament and brutal ways, could try to launch a battery of attacks to try to assert his control over TTP and prove his worthiness as Baitullah´s heir. At the time of writing the gauntlet already appears to have been thrown down with a bloody suicide bomber killing 22 border guards in the Khyber Agency on August 27. This was followed by another suicide blast in the Swat valley on August 30, in which 14 police recruits were killed. Needless to say, security risks are likely to remain elevated over the coming months, a state of affairs reflected in Pakistan´s low short-term score (49.6) in our political risk ratings.
Significantly, there has been a great deal of speculation over the strategic focus of the Taliban under the new leadership, and in particular whether they are likely to channel more energy towards the insurgency in Afghanistan than has hitherto been the case. So far there have been no firm indications of such a shift, but this could partly be explained by the transitional phase that the TTP is in. Again, much hinges on Hakimullah´s ability to prevent the movement from splintering into different groups with separate agendas. A related question is whether or not the Pakistani military is likely to go ahead with its planned military offensive in the Waziristan region, or whether it will deem it less of an urgency now that the Taliban are at least partially on the back foot. In mid-August a Pakistani general was quoted in the media saying that ´it is going to take months´, when referring to the preparatory time needed before the offensive could start. To be sure, fighting in the treacherous Waziristan mountains – which are ideal for the Taliban´s guerrilla-style warfare – is a tall order even for the most experienced of soldiers.
The military top brass has displayed some reluctance to open up a second front, while the campaign in the Malakand region is still ongoing. By the looks of it, this full-on offensive, which commenced in April, is entering a more stable phase with large parts of the Swat valley having been cleared of insurgents and internally displaced people slowly returning home. Indeed, on September 1 an army spokesman said that more than 100 Taliban militants, including 18 wanted ‘terrorists’, had surrendered to security forces in the Swat valley. On the same day there were reports that the army had killed 40 militants in a raid in the Khyber region. This display of action has no doubt comforted Pakistan´s Western allies, and Washington in particular, who before the present military crackdown had expressed serious doubt about Pakistan´s commitment to combating the militants. However, as amply demonstrated by history, a decisive victory over the Taliban and their allies will unlikely be attained by force alone. Efforts to raise living standards in the tribal areas, enfranchise locals and lift the aspirations of disillusioned young men remain pivotal to weaken the Taliban´s ability to replenish itself.
